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1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the CADC erroneously 
vacated~wo regulations i~ promulgated under §210(a) of the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"), as 
inconsistent with other provisions of PURPA. 
2. FACTS: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
("FERC") promulgated a number of rules under authority given it 
by §210(a) of PURPA to make rules it determined necessary to 
V v" I(_ \. "\ 
encourage cogeneration and small power production. Cogeneration 
is the simultaneous production of electricity and usable thermal 
energy, such as heat or steam. Small power production is the use 
of biomass, waste, geothermal, or renewable resources to produce 
. v.::: ~ . . . 
electric power. Two of these regulations promulgated under ...........-
§210(a) of PURPA are at issue in this case. Th~ 
§292.304(b), particularly subsections (2) and (4), relate to the · 
price at which utilities must purchase electricity from 
~
\...---? • 
cogeneration facilities and small power production facilities. 
For ease of reference, such facilities will be referred to as 
.A~ualifying facilitie~. Section 292.304 (b) (2) and (4), termed the 
"full avoided cost rule," provides that a utility must purchase 
electricity from qualifying facilities at a rate that equals that 
utility's full avoided cost. ~Full avoided cos~ is simply a 
synonym for the marginal cost a utility would incur if it 
obtained electricity from another source, such as by increased 
production of power at its own facility. 
The~~ule under attack, S292.303(c) (1), provides that 
"any electric utility shall make such interconnections with any 
'-/ qualifying facility as may be necessary to accomplish purchases 
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/ [from] and sales [to]" qualifying utilities. An interconnection 
is a pysical connection that permits electricity to flow from one 
utility to another. This rule has been termed the 
"interconnection rule." 
These regulations have been challenged by resp as 
inconsistent with certain provisions of PURPA and the Federal 
Power Act ("FPA"). Specifically, the~ded cost rule is said 
"'"-"" -
to conflict with §210(b) of PURPA. Section 210(b) of PURPA 
provides: 
"(b) RATES FOR PURCHASES BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
"The rules prescribed [by FERC] ••• shall 
ensure that, in requiring any electric utility to 
offer to purchase electric energy from any 
qualifying cogeneration facility or qualifying 
small power production facility, the rates for 
such purpose--
"(1) shall be just and reasonable 
to the electric consumers of the electric 
utility and in the public interest, and 
"(2) shall not discriminate against 
qualifying cogenerators or qualifying 
small power producers. 
"No such rule prescribed ••• shall provide for 
a rate which exceeds the incremental cost to the 
electric utility of alternative electric energy." 
The~terconnection rule is said to undermine §§210 and 
.... 
212 
of the FPA, and thus conflict with §210(e) (3), which expressly 
provides that qualifying facilities may not be exempted from 
§§210-212 of the FPA. Section 210 of the FPA gives FERC the 
power to order interconnection and make any ancillary orders 
necessary to make interconnection effective. Subsection (a) 
provides that such orders may be entered upon the application of 
any utility or qualifying facility. Subsection (b) provides that 
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/ before making such an order FERC issue notice to all affected 
parties and provide an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. 
Subsection (c) provides that FERC is only to issue the requested 
order if such an order is in the public interest, would either 
encourage overall conservation of energy capital, optimize the 
efficient use of facilities or resources, or improve the 
reliability of any electric utility to which it applies, and 
meets the requirements of §212. Subsection (d) gives FERC the 
power to initiate such a proceeding on its own motion. Section 
212 provides that FERC shall not issue an order under §210, 
unless it determines that such order will not lead to four 
specified harms to the producer of power forced to interconnect 
or its customers. 
FERC's justification for the rules was provided in FERC 
Order No. 69 and its order granting in part and denying in part 
rehearing on Orders 69 and 70. FERC noted that it had initially 
proposed that there be a rebuttable presumption that the rate at 
which utilities purchased power from qualifying facilities was 
acceptable if it reflected full avoided cost. Because it 
received comments that the rule was ambiguous, explained FERC, it 
settled upon the challenged rule. FERC then addressed a number 
of comments, including comments of utilities that they and their 
ratepayers would be subject to increasing costs of world energy 
if the rate they had to pay for power from qualified facilities 
was set at full avoided cost. In response to arguments pro and 
con, FERC said: 
. . 
-5-
"The Commission notes that, in most instances, 
if part of the savings from cogeneration and 
small power production were allocated among the 
utilities' ratepayers, ~n~ rate reductions will 
be insi nificant for an 1naividu tomer. On 
tne ot er han , if hese savings are allocated to 
the relatively small class of qualifying 
cogenerators and small power producers, they may 
provide a significant incentive for a higher 
growth rate of these technologies." Petn. at B-
65. 
FERC explained that another problem of attempting to split 
between qualifying facilities and electricity consumers the 
difference between the qualifying facilities costs and that of 
alternate sources of energy was that it would have to determine 
the costs of qualifying facilities. "A major portion of 
[PURPA]," it explained, "is intended to exempt qualifying 
facilities from cost-of-service regulation by which utilities 
traditionally have been regulated." 
~RC responded in its rehearing order to the argument that 
its interconnection rule contravened S210(e) (3) of PURPA. FERC 
noted that §§210 and 212 grant the right to apply for 
interconnection orders, but also impose an obligation or 
liability of being subjected to such orders. Section 210(e) (3) 
was meant to prevent FERC from relieving qualifying facilities 
from the liabilities of §§210 and 212, it did not make the 
sections the exclusive vehicle for the exercise of the privilege 
of forcing interconnection. Such an interpretation is consistent 
with the accepted meaning of "exempt" -- "to release or deliver 
from some liability or requirement to which others are subject." 
The privilege of forcing interconnection is not a liability or a 
requirement, while the amenability to an interconnection order is 
-6-
such a liability or requirement. FERC cited no legislative 
history for this proposition. 
3. DECISION BELOW: The~C vacated both of the ,, , ..
regulations. It first discussed the full avoided cost rule. The 
court began its discussion by saying that it was holding that 
"FERC had not adequately justified its adoption of the full 
avoided cost standard." It noted, quoting a passage from the 
Conference Report on PURPA, that the limitation of the price 
which utilities could be forced to pay to the utilities' marginal 
cost was not meant to supercede the "jus~nd reasonable" 
standard for determining price. It then rejected FERC's three 
reasons for the full avoided cost rule. The court said that FERC 
had provided no factual basis for the claim that any lowering of 
price to utilities would lead to insignificant rate reductions to 
utility customers. FERC's desire to avoid rate setting on the 
basis of the qualifying facility's costs could have been served 
by setting the price at some percentage of avoidable cost. 
Finally, FERC justified its rule by saying that if the price were 
set at some percentage of avoidable cost the price would be 
insufficient to induce potential qualifying facilities to begin 
production. The court said, however, that "FERC should allocate 
the benefits more evenly between [qualifying facilities] and 
utilities if the utilities can demonstrate that, under a 
percentage of avoided cost approach, an allocation less heavily 
favoring the [qualifying facility] is in the public interest and 
the interest of utilities' electric consumers, and will not 
disproportionately discourage [the production from qualifying 
-7-
facilities]." The court then set out some concerns that FERC 
should consider on remand. First, full avoided cost might not be 
in the public interest because cogeneration and small production 
facilities whose cost equal that of utilities may produce more 
detrimental effects in such forms as more pollution or less tax 
revenues. Moreover, by reducing the number of kilowatt hours 
over which utilities can spread their fixed costs, increased 
sales of power by qualifying facilities may raise the per 
kilowatt the price of utility-produced power. The court then 
explained that if competitive forces existed in the market for 
cogeneration and non-fossil-fuel based power, FERC should take 
such forces into account in determining the degree and type of 
regulation necessary. If the market for such power is not 
competititve, said the court, FERC may be justified in its 
current regulation of the rates charged by utilities. Even then, 
however, it would not be clear that full avoided cost is the 
proper rate level. 
~ 1) 
With respect to the interconnection rule, the court also 
rejected FERC's arguments. First, it concluded, contrary to 
FERC's suggestion, that forcing qualifying facilities to go 
through adversary hearings before being able to force 
interconnection would impose an undue burden on such facilities. 
FERC, the court concluded, could adopt streamlined procedures for 
making the necessary findings under §§210 and 212, and thus 
relieve qualifying facilities from the present burdens of the 
hearing process. It dealt with the argument FERC presented in 
the rehearing order as follows: 
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"Finally, FERC argues that rule 292.303(c) (1) 
is consistent with PURPA section 210 (e) (3) if the 
latter is interpreted as protecting cogenerators 
who are targets of other parties seeking 
interconnection, and not extended to situations 
where the cogenerator is an applicant for an 
interconnection itself. While an interesting and 
not inherently implausible suggestion, the 
Commission points to no evidence in the 
legislative history or the statute itself to 
justify this interpretation, which is both 
counterintuitive and inconsistent with the 
statute's explicit provisions. Nor were we able 
to find such evidence. Accordingly, we reject 
the interpretation. The Commission's 
interconnection rule is hereby vacated." Petn. 
at B-24 to B-25 (emphasis in original). 
~ERC petitioned for rehearing. Only five CADC judges 
participated in the decision, two of the five dissented from the 
denial of rehearing en bane. The acllssen.ters said that, as they 
. 
read FERC's orders, FERC had found that the interests set out in 
§210(b) of PURPA could best be accommodated by a rate that would 
encourage cogeneration without raising rates to consumers. They 
said this determination seemed reasonable, and they expressed 
doubt as to whether any further explanation was necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. §706 (2) (A). With respect to the interconnection rule, the 
dissenters said that in rejecting the rule the panel: 
"has rejected FERC's alternative interpretation 
of the statute that would simply prevent the 
Commission from requiring a cogenerator to 
interconnect without providing for an evidentiary 
hearing. The alternative interpretation is a 
plausible one and appears to be more closely in 
line with Congress' expressed desire to encourage 
cogeneration. This alternative reading should 
receive closer scrutiny by this court before it 
erects a formidable, perhaps insurmountable, 
roadblock to a major energy program." Petn. at 
B-208. 
" ( 4. CONTENTIONS: The 
-9- ~cAPD5.{j. 
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SG. With respect to the 
interconnection rule, the SG reasserts the argument that FERC 
presented in its rehearing order. The SG also argues that the 
decision below frustrates two of Congress' desires. First, the 
decision below will undermine Congress' attempt to encourage 
cogeneration and small power production, by requiring a full-
scale administrative adjudiction before a utility could be 
compelled to purchase electricity from a qualifying utility. 
Secondly, by requiring a proceeding before FERC, and thus 
rendering invalid FERC rules leaving the resolution of conflicts 
over interconnection to state authorities, the CADC has 
frustrated Congress' desire to leave the detailed case-by-case 
oversight of interconnections to state authorities. 
With respect to the full avoided cost rule, while the CADC 
claimed to hold only that FERC had offered insufficient 
justification for the rule, the CADC's decision indicates that 
such a rule cannot be adopted regardless of the justification 
that FERC proffers for it. In any event, since the rate set by 
FERC was within the zone of reasonableness, as defined by 
Congress when it provided that the price qualifying facilities 
could charge could not be set above the utility's marginal cost, 
the CADC lacked authority to vacate the rate. Permian Basis Rate 
Cases, 390 u.s. 747, 767 (1968). The CADC mischaracterized 
FERC's rule, since even under the rule many utilities may not 
have to pay full avoided cost when the utility purchases power 
from a qualifying utility. Any state may apply for a waiver of 
FERC's rule, and qualifying facilities and utilities may 
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negotiate prices that are lower than the full avoided costs. The 
CADC also erred in outlining a host of concerns to be examined on 
remand, for by doing so the CADC substituted its judgment for 
that of FERC. Indeed, the CADC seemed to apply a "substantial 
evidence" test, rather than an "arbitrary and capricious" test, 
when reviewing the two FERC regulations. Finally, because many 
states have adopted regulations in reliance on the "full avoided 
cost rule," and because some rule is necessary so that new 
qualifying facilities will be certain enough of the price they 
can obtain to make investments and obtain capital, the benefits 
Congress sought to achieve by PURPA may never be realized if the 
decisjon below is not reversed. 
/ American Paper Institute ("API") (Intervenor Below). The 
'~ vacatur of the interconnection rule will have a devastating 
impact on the cogeneration and small power production industries. 
Qualifying facilities cannot find a market for their power unless 
they can promptly obtain interconnections. Cogenerators and 
small power producers, faced with the obstacle of having to fight 
utilities in an adversary context (in which the utilities have a 
wealth of experience and numerous opportunities for delay) before 
they can obtain needed interconnections, will simply not go 
forward with production. Such a result would undercut the 
policies underlying PURPA. Moreover, by rejecting FERC's 
conclusion that S210(e) (3) only subjected qualifying utilities 
interconnection orders, the court rejected a reasonable 
interpretation of S210(e) (3). The court thus ignored the rule 
that an agency interpretation of a statute should be honored if 
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it is not clearly wrong. The maxim c~rries special weight when 
the challenged interpretation is a contemporaneous construction 
of new legislation. 
The vacatur of the full avoided cost rule will also have a 
devastating impact. Owners of potential qualifying facilities 
cannot make any of the decisions they need to make to begin or 
continue production because they have no way of estimating the 
revenue streams that their projects can be expected to generate. 
The uncertainty cast upon this important federal program by the 
decision below makes this case a particularly compelling one for 
review by this Court. (API then repeats the argument in the SG's 
brief that the FERC rule was examined under too exacting a 
standard of review.) 
Respondent. The vacatur of the full avoided cost rule does 
not merit review. The court simply said that the adoption of the 
rule was ill-considered, and indeed "the Court of Appeals 
exercised circumspection and restraint, finding that the 
Commission appears not to have adhered to the statutory commands, 
but giving it the opportunity to adopt the same rule on remand if 
it can present a cogent justification of its rule in light of 
statutory instructions." The decision below was right. The rate 
set was not "just and reasonable." The "just and reasonable" 
standard requires a balancing of the interest of the parties. By 
setting a maximum, Congress did not intend to set a zone of 
reasonableness. The argument that the actual rates may be lower 
than the rates set by FERC is a post hoc rationalization of the 
rate FERC adopted. Moreover, the state's ability to request 
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waiver of FERC regulations does not really help the customers of 
the utility, since they cannot initiate such a request, and the 
fact that qualified facilities may not demand the full rate to 
which they are entitled cannot save an unreasonable and unjust 
rate. Finally, any uncertainty or delay occasioned by the rule 
below is unfortunate, but they are the result of FERC's failure 
to promulgate a lawful rule in a timely manner. 
The vacatur of the interconnection rule presents no 
certworthy issue. The court below found that the rule violated 
the plain meaning of the statute. The argument that the CADC's 
interpretation of the statute frustrates congressional purposes 
is mistaken for two reasons. First, it ignores the powerful 
federal interest, furthered by §§210 and 212 of the FPA, in 
assuring that interconnections are safe and reliable. Second, it 
makes statutory hearing procedures seem onerous when such 
procedures could, given FERC's powers to restrict the opportunity 
for a hearing to those cases in which a party meets the threshold 
requirements established by an agency, be simple and 
unburdensome. 
Resp Elizabethtown Gas Co. Elizabethtown Gas Co. supports 
the petition, but adds nothing new. 
5. DISCUSSION: Thev;alidity of the "interconnection rule" 
seems certworthy. FERC's interpretation of §210(e) (3) of PURPA 
as permitting interconnection orders in the absence of a hearing 
and the determinations required by §§210 and 212 of the FPA seems 
reasonable. The~ADC decision requiring some FERC determination 
under §§210 and 212 of the FPA may well make it difficult for 
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qualified utilities to obtain interconnection with utilities. 
Such a ruling might make obtaining interconnection difficult for 
cogenerators and small power producers, and reestablish the 
bottleneck Congress tried to break by passing PURPA. (It is 
possible, however, that FERC could break this bottleneck by 
adopting streamlined procedures.) 
~ 
The vacatur of the full avoidable cost rule is probably not 
worthy of cert. The CADC has not conclusively said that such a 
rule cannot be adopted. Moreover, even if ultimately FERC will 
only be able to promulgate a rule that allows the rate to a 
qualifying utility to range between 80% to 100% of avoidable cost 
(a possible rule suggested by the CADC panel), the policies 
Congress sought to further by passing PURPA will probably not be 
~ 
gravely damaged. I do note, however, that the CADC's decision 
does make it difficult for FERC to justify a full avoidable cost 
rule, and thus if such a rule is indeed crucial to the success of 
PURPA the vacatur of the full avoidable cost rule should probably 
be reviewed. 
I recommend a grant limited to the validity of the vacatur 
of the interconnection rule. 
There is a response covering Nos. 82-226 and 82-34 in No. 
82-226. There is an additional response in No. 82-34. 
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Please see Preliminary Memo in No. 82-34, American Paper 
Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corporation, 
et al., October 8, 1982 Conference (List 1, Sheet 2). 
There is a response. 





in No. 82-34 
I 
. ' ' 
.. 
. ':.:... 
October 8, 1982 
CO'Urt ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 . . . 
' 
Assigned .................. , 19 .. . 82-226 No. 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
FERC 
VB. 
AM. ELEC. POWER 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
Stevens, J ........................... . 




N POST DI S AFF REV AFF G D 
. ......... '1)" .... . . . . 
··········~ -~~-
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
October 8, 1982 
Court . . . . . , ........ 19 ... 
Submitted ......... . . 
19 ... .... , ..... A
rgued · · · · · · · · · · 19 .. · 
.... . , 
"Voted on.·:·· 19. · · 
........... , A
ssigned · · · · · · · 19 . . · 
.... .. ' Announced ......... . 
Burger, Ch. J ...... . .. . 
Brennan, J ................. . 
White, J. · · · · · · · · · · · · . .. . 
. . . . Marshall, J · · · · · · · · · · . . . . .. 
Blackmun, J · · · · · · · · ...... . 
Powell, J ............. . . . . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
~ Stevens, J .. ········ ····· 
O'Connor, J · · · · · · · · · · ... .... 
................ . . . . 
PAPER INST I TUTE AM. 
vs. 
ELEC. POWER AM. 
82-34 
No. 
NOT VOTI NG 
drk 10/13/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: Disqualification When a Trade Association is a Party 
Canon 3C (1) (c) of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides 
that a judge should disqualify himself when his impartiality might 
be questioned because "he knows that .•. he has a financial interest 
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding." Advisory Opinion No. 49 
addresses the question of whether a judge's financial interest in a 
member of a trade association requires disqualification. It adopts 
the position advanced by Professor Thode in his Notes to the ABA 
Code of Judicial Conduct and distinguishes between direct financial 
ownership and indirect or technical ownership. It determines that 
owning stock in a member of a trade association, like owning a 
policy in a mutual insurance company, is an indirect financial 
interest that does not require disqualification. 
The Opinion concludes: 
Accordingly, the Committee sees no impropriety in a judge 
serving in a proceeding where a trade association appears 
as a party, even though the judge owns a small percentage 
of the publicly-traded shares of one or more members of 
the association, subject, of course, to the general 
qualifications set forth in sections 3C (1) (c) and 3C (3) (c) 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 





The Opinion expressly qualifies its approval by referring 
to sections 3C {1) {c) and 3C {3) (c), which provide for 
disqualification when a judge has any interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceedings. It would seem that if a 
ruling had the possibility of materially affecting the economic 
health of an industry represented by a trade association, an 
interest in a member of the industry might require disqualification. 
A review of the cases under 28 u.s.c. §455 indicates that 
no court has decided the question of whether owning stock in a 
member of a trade association requires disqualification. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.:%ttttrtmt <!j:ttttrl cf ±4t 11htittb .:§tdt,tr 
~ a.s-Jrhtgtcn, ~. <q:. 20 &i J1. ~ 
October 14, 1982 
No. 82-34 American Paper Institute v. American 
Electric Power Service Corp. 
No. 82-226 FERC v. American Electric Power 
Service Corp. 
Dear Chief, 
Based on Lewis' memo of October 14 and the 
opinion of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities 
concerning stock ownership in a member of a trade 
association when only the trade association is a party, 
I plan to participate in the referenced cases. You 
may disregard my previous expression of recusal. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Justice Powell 
Alexander L. Stevas 
Sincerely, 
October 14, 1982 
8 2-34 Amer i.cart Paper Institute v. A.mer ican lUectr ic Power 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This refers to our discussion last Friday as to 
disqualification where one owns stock in a company that is a 
member of a trade association where only the trade 
association is a party. 
This question has been answered by the Advisory 
Committee on Judicial Activities. I f\nclose a copy of its 
Opinion No. 49 dated ,June 9, 1q77. This was reaffirmed in 
Opinion No. 62 in 1979. 
Although these opinions refer to provisions of the 
Code of Judicial Connuct, th~ federal statute, ?.8 u.s.~. 
§455, tracks the Code in the relevant language. 
~he petitioner in this case, Arnerican Paper 
Institute, is said to have 164 members. Our family and 
trusts own stock in one of the listed members. Two other 
companies in which we have an i.nterest have "affiliates" or 
subsidiaries listed among the members of the petitioner. I 
personally represented the two parent corporations and would 
remain out if their subsidiaries w~re parties without regard 
to stock interest. 
I have not heretofore recused simply bec~use of 
intereet in a member of a trade association where only the 
association is the ~arty. I suppose there are situations 
where the case is of such considerable importance to an 
entire industry that arguably its outcome could have some 
effect even on one's ownership of a small fractional 
interest in a company's listed and publicly tradeif shares. 
I think the ruling of the Advisory Committee is 
correct, as it is unlikely there was any intent to extend 
"recusal" this far. A judge's ownership in a mutual or 
"common investment fund" presents a stronger case for 




~1arch U, 1983 
A2-34 American Paper Institute v. Am~rican 
Electric Power Service Corp. 
82-226 FERC v. American Electric Power Service Corp. 
near r'hief: 
It now appears necessar.v for me to remain out of 
the above cases. 
Petitioner's brief, file~ December 2 and that I 
looked at this morninq for the first time, is signed by 
counsel for several companies, incl,HHnq a company in 'i'7hich 
Jo and a trust for her benefit hol~ stock. 
When we considered certiorari on these cases, T 
mentioned at Conference the fact that amonq the 164 members 
of the American Paper Insti.tute (a trade association) were a 
couple of former clients in which we also held stock. There 
are opinions of the Ethics Committee to the effect that this 
would not require disqualifi.cation. See my letter to the 
Conference of October 14. Although I passen at the Confer-
ence, I then thouqht I was free to participate. 
The counsel whose name now appears on the brief 
for petitioner was not listed as counsel on the petition for 
certiorari. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
